Two notions of shame
| dc.citation.epage | 349 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 3 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 328 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 27 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Berkovski, Y. S. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T11:03:31Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T11:03:31Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | On most accounts present in the literature, the complex experience of shame has the injury to self-esteem as its main component. A rival view, originally propounded by St Augustine, relates shame to the structure of human agency, and more specifically, to the conflict between will and desire. A recent version of this view developed by David Velleman relates shame to the capacity of self-presentation and the need for privacy. I examine two different interpretations of Velleman's theory and argue that neither suggests a credible alternative to the received view. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/rati.12051 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0034-0006 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/26692 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12051 | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Ratio | en_US |
| dc.title | Two notions of shame | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
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