Costly preparations in bargaining

buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
buir.contributor.orcidKaragözoğlu, Emin|0000-0003-2442-6949
dc.citation.epage557en_US
dc.citation.spage532en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorRachmilevitch, S.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-08T08:11:08Z
dc.date.available2021-03-08T08:11:08Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe model costly preparations in negotiations and study their effect on agreements in a bilateral bargaining game. In our model, players bargain over a unit pie, where each player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning of every period t, if he wants to stay in the game in period t+1 in case a deal has not been reached by the end of t. Whether a player has paid this cost (i.e., prepared for negotiations in t+1) is his private information. If only player i stops paying, then player j receives the entire pie. We characterize a “war of attrition” equilibrium, which is a symmetric equilibrium. We do not know whether the game has other symmetric equilibria, but we show that if such an equilibrium exists, its payoff converges to zero as the frictions (discounting and preparation cost) vanish. Efficiency can be obtained by asymmetric play. Specifically, with asymmetric strategies every Pareto‐efficient payoff vector can be approximated in equilibrium, provided that the cost of preparations is sufficiently small and that the discount factor is sufficiently close to one.en_US
dc.embargo.release2022-03-06
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/sjoe.12409en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9442
dc.identifier.issn0347-0520
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75863
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishingen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12409en_US
dc.source.titleScandinavian Journal of Economicsen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectPreparation costsen_US
dc.subjectPrivate informationen_US
dc.subjectWar of attritionen_US
dc.titleCostly preparations in bargainingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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