Quadratic privacy-signaling games and payoff dominant equilibria

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buir.contributor.authorKazıklı, Ertan
buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.citation.epage1372en_US
dc.citation.spage1367en_US
dc.contributor.authorKazıklı, Ertan
dc.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, S.
dc.coverage.spatialLos Angeles, CA, USAen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-03T13:44:20Z
dc.date.available2021-02-03T13:44:20Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionDate of Conference: 21-26 June 2020en_US
dc.descriptionConference name: 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2020en_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider a privacy-signaling game problem in which a transmitter with privacy concerns and a receiver, which does not pay attention to these privacy concerns, communicate. In this communication scenario, the transmitter observes a pair of correlated random variables which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The transmitter constructs its message based on these random variables with the aim to hide one of them and convey the other one. In contrast, the objective of the receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random variables so as to gather as much information as possible. These conflicting objectives are analyzed in a game theoretic framework where depending on the commitment conditions (of the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg equilibria. We show that a payoff dominant (i.e., most desirable for both players) Nash equilibrium is attained by affine policies and we explicitly characterize these policies. In addition, the strategies at the characterized Nash equilibrium is shown to form also a Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that there always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter setup. We also revisit the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg framework under the mean squared error distortion criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the parameters is observed at the sender. We fully characterize the Stackelberg equilibria under certain conditions and when these conditions are not met we establish the existence of informative equilibria.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ISIT44484.2020.9174355en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781728164328
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/54982
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISIT44484.2020.9174355en_US
dc.source.titleIEEE International Symposium on Information Theoryen_US
dc.titleQuadratic privacy-signaling games and payoff dominant equilibriaen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
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