A priori physicalism and the knowledge argument

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buir.contributor.authorKıymaz, Tufan
dc.citation.epage103en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage87en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber39en_US
dc.contributor.authorKıymaz, Tufan
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-04T06:40:14Z
dc.date.available2021-03-04T06:40:14Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractI defend Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against the a priori physicalist objection that for all we know, the deducibility thesis, the thesis that phenomenal knowledge is in principle deducible from physical/functional knowledge, is true. I discuss the force of the common intuition against the deducibility thesis and the plausibility of the attempts in the literature in defense of the deducibility thesis. I argue that a priori physicalists both fail to remove the burden of proof from their shoulders to convince us that deducibility thesis is plausible and fail to offer an intelligible scenario in which phenomenal knowledge is possibly deduced from physical/phenomenal knowledge.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0210-1602
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75752
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherKRK Edicionesen_US
dc.source.titleTeoremaen_US
dc.subjectA priori physicalismen_US
dc.subjectDeducibilityen_US
dc.subjectKnowledge argumenten_US
dc.subjectPhenomenal consciousnessen_US
dc.titleA priori physicalism and the knowledge argumenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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