Un argument probabilistic pentruteza identitatii minte-creier

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dc.citation.epage29en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage5en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber3en_US
dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-29T12:56:31Z
dc.date.available2019-01-29T12:56:31Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I offer a new, probabilistic argument for the mind‐brain identity thesis, put forward by U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart in the 1950s. After considering the epistemic, or conceivability based arguments against physicalism, I build an argument to the effect that naturalistic dualism ‐ the view that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but they are nomically connected – is probabilistically incoherent. The conclusion will be that phsyicalism, in the form of the identity thesis, is almost surely true.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1843-9969
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/48485
dc.language.isoRumanianen_US
dc.publisherEditura Universităţii din Bucureştien_US
dc.source.titleRevista de Filosofie Analiticăen_US
dc.subjectPhysicalismen_US
dc.subjectMind‐brain identity thesisen_US
dc.subjectConceivability argumentsen_US
dc.subjectZombiesen_US
dc.subjectQualia inversionen_US
dc.subjectHerbert Feiglen_US
dc.subjectIndifference principlesen_US
dc.subjectProbabilityen_US
dc.titleUn argument probabilistic pentruteza identitatii minte-creieren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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