Majority voting rule and oligarchic social choice rules

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buir.advisorHusseinov, Farhad
dc.contributor.authorPasin, Pelin
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T18:09:34Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T18:09:34Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 2001.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2001.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 21.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents, neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness characterize majority voting rule. In the second part, the relation between T-monotonicity and the group which acts as the oligarchy in an oligarchic social choice rule, is analyzed. It is shown that the minimal coalition for which the social choice rule is monotonic constitutes the oligarchy.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.A.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityPasin, Pelinen_US
dc.format.extentvi, 21 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/14853
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choiceen_US
dc.subjectOligarchyen_US
dc.subjectMonotonicityen_US
dc.subjectMajority Votingen_US
dc.subject.lccHB846.8 .P37 2001en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial choice--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshVoting--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshBureaucracy.en_US
dc.subject.lcshAuthoritarianism.en_US
dc.subject.lcshOligarchy.en_US
dc.subject.lcshPolitical sociology.en_US
dc.titleMajority voting rule and oligarchic social choice rulesen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
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