Equilibrium in a civilized jungle

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buir.contributor.authorYıldız, Kemal
buir.contributor.orcidYıldız, Kemal|0000-0003-4352-3197
dc.citation.epage953en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage943en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber17en_US
dc.contributor.authorRubinstein, Ariel
dc.contributor.authorYıldız, Kemal
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-28T10:42:49Z
dc.date.available2023-02-28T10:42:49Z
dc.date.issued2022-07
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThe jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium, (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium, and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem. Copyright © 2022 The Authors.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE4886en_US
dc.identifier.issn19336837
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/111908
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSociety for Economic Theoryen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE4886en_US
dc.source.titleTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.subjectC0en_US
dc.subjectCivilized equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectD0en_US
dc.subjectJungle equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectJustifiabilityen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium in a civilized jungleen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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