Dynamic signaling games under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria

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buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
buir.contributor.authorYüksel, Serdar
buir.contributor.authorSarıtaş, Serkan
dc.citation.epage1635en_US
dc.citation.spage1631en_US
dc.contributor.authorSarıtaş, Serkanen_US
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, Serdaren_US
dc.contributor.authorGezici, Sinanen_US
dc.coverage.spatialBarcelona, Spainen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T11:49:05Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T11:49:05Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionDate of Conference: 10-15 July 2016en_US
dc.descriptionConference Name: IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this study, dynamic and repeated quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated. These involve encoder and decoders with mismatched performance objectives, where the encoder has a bias term in the quadratic cost functional. We consider both Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria as our solution concepts, under a perfect Bayesian formulation. These two lead to drastically different characteristics for the equilibria. For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we show that fully revealing equilibria cannot exist and the final state equilibria have to be quantized for a large class of source models; whereas, for the Stackelberg case, the equilibria must be fully revealing regardless of the source model. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel is considered, the equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources under Stackelberg equilibria, and affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for Nash equilibria.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541575en_US
dc.identifier.issn2157-8095
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/37723
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2016.7541575en_US
dc.source.titleProceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2016en_US
dc.subjectBayesian networksen_US
dc.subjectBayesian formulationen_US
dc.subjectEquilibrium policyen_US
dc.subjectGaussian channelsen_US
dc.subjectGaussian sourcesen_US
dc.subjectInvariant subspaceen_US
dc.subjectPerformance objectiveen_US
dc.subjectQuadratic costsen_US
dc.subjectSolution conceptsen_US
dc.subjectInformation theoryen_US
dc.titleDynamic signaling games under Nash and Stackelberg equilibriaen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
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