Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion

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dc.citation.epage165en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage157en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber61en_US
dc.contributor.authorKarakaya, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T09:53:20Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T09:53:20Z
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies hedonic coalition formation games where each player's preferences rely only upon the members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introduced which is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games and it is the strongest stability notion appropriate to the context of hedonic coalition formation games. The weak top-choice property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. It is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. Strong Nash stability under different membership rights is also studied.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.004en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/21939
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.004en_US
dc.source.titleMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.titleHedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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