Corruption, connections and transparency: does a better screen imply a better scene?
dc.citation.epage | 96 | en_US |
dc.citation.issueNumber | 1-2 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 87 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 107 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Bac, M. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T10:34:09Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T10:34:09Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | en_US |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish "connections" for corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with standard theories of transparency. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1023/A:1010349907813 | en_US |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1573-7101 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-5829 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24772 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer New York LLC | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1010349907813 | en_US |
dc.source.title | Public Choice | en_US |
dc.subject | Decision maker | en_US |
dc.subject | Expected payoff | en_US |
dc.subject | Nash bargaining solution | en_US |
dc.subject | Total surplus | en_US |
dc.subject | Political corruption | en_US |
dc.title | Corruption, connections and transparency: does a better screen imply a better scene? | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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