Negotiating development among unequals: Turkey and the European Economic Community, 1960–1980

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2023-06
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J. Hirst, Samuel
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English
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This dissertation analyzes the trajectory of the Association relationship between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey by examining previously unexamined primary sources and relevant theoretical literature. After providing an overview of the literature on the Association, Europe’s trade policies, and development during the Cold War, it examines post-war international trade and the place of the EEC and Turkey in it. The dissertation draws primarily on EEC documents and suggests that the initial stages of Association were driven mostly by political factors, especially Turkey’s geopolitical importance in the Cold War and efforts to keep parallelism with Greece. In later stages, however, the concessions provided to Turkey started to erode as similar concessions were provided not only to Greece but also to a number of developing countries. Worsening economic conditions in Turkey in the 1970s led Turkey to request more concessions from the EEC. While the EEC internally acknowledged that Turkey’s requests were reasonable, it refrained from making meaningful concessions. This increasing divergence of positions led Turkey to suspend the Association not once but twice, first by a right-leaning and then by a left-leaning government. Disagreements over the economic foundations of the Association reveal that the Association had lost its attraction as support for Turkey’s development, an idea that was originally proclaimed as its core objective. From a theoretical perspective, the dissertation suggests the Association provides an effective case to study how intergovernmental economic negotiations have overlapped with development politics.

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