Judicial review and the defence of (democratic) constitutionality: a critique of the argument from disagreement

dc.citation.epage	42	en_US
dc.citation.spage	7	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Vinx, Lars	en_US
dc.contributor.editor	Carbonell, F.
dc.contributor.editor	Menendez, A. J.
dc.contributor.editor	Fossum, J. E.
dc.coverage.spatial	Oslo-Norway	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2019-07-12T08:29:41Z
dc.date.available	2019-07-12T08:29:41Z
dc.date.issued	2011-09	en_US
dc.department	Department of Philosophy	en_US
dc.description	Chapter 1	en_US
dc.description.abstract	The aim of this paper is to offer a defence of the practice of constitutional review from the point of view of a theory of democratic legitimacy. I will develop this defence by engaging with the strongest criticism to date of the practice of constitutional review: Jeremy Waldron’s and Richard Bellamy’s argument that constitutional review violates the principle of democratic equality, respect for which is a necessary condition of legitimate political decision-taking in a pluralist society characterized by reasonable disagreement about rights.	en_US
dc.identifier.eisbn	9788293137832
dc.identifier.isbn	9788293137337
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11693/52251
dc.language.iso	English	en_US
dc.publisher	University of Oslo	en_US
dc.relation.ispartof	Hope, reluctance or fear: the democratic consequences of the case law of the European Court of justice	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	ARENA Report;5/11
dc.title	Judicial review and the defence of (democratic) constitutionality: a critique of the argument from disagreement	en_US
dc.type	Book Chapter	en_US

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