Self-made people

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dc.citation.epage1099en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber500en_US
dc.citation.spage1071en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber125en_US
dc.contributor.authorKovacs, D. M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:44:26Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:44:26Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractThe Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun 'I', so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very mechanism of self-reference. Other than providing an elegant solution to the Problem of Overlappers, the view can be motivated on independent grounds. It also has wide-ranging consequences for how we should be thinking about persons. Among other things, it can help undermine an influential line of argument against the permissibility of elective amputation. After a detailed discussion and defence of the self-making view, I consider some objections to it. I conclude that none of these objections is persuasive and we should at the very least take seriously the idea that we are to some extent self-made. © Kovacs 2016.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/mind/fzv176en_US
dc.identifier.issn0026-4423
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36565
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv176en_US
dc.source.titleMinden_US
dc.titleSelf-made peopleen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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