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      Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium

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      Author(s)
      Kamihigashi, T.
      Keskin, K.
      Sağlam, Çağrı
      Date
      2021-10
      Source Title
      Theory and Decision
      Print ISSN
      0040-5833
      Electronic ISSN
      1573-7187
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      91
      Pages
      289 - 312
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      27
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      Abstract
      Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions consider cases in which any coalition can be formed. Accordingly, there may arise “conflicts of interest” that prevent a player from choosing an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of two coalitions to which he or she belongs. Here, we address this observation by studying an organizational framework such that the coalitional structure is (i) motivated by real-life examples where players cannot form some coalitions and (ii) formulated in such a way that no conflicts of interest remain. We define an organization as an ordered collection of partitions of the player set such that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For any given organization, we introduce the notion of organizational Nash equilibrium. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games
      Keywords
      Nash equilibrium
      Refinements
      Coalitional structure
      Organizational structure
      Games with strategic complementarities
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/77272
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09812-5
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      • Department of Economics 697
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