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dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, Istvan
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-10T08:12:52Z
dc.date.available2021-03-10T08:12:52Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75910
dc.description.abstractThe paper explicates and defends a direct realist view of episodic memory as pastperception, on the model of the more prominent direct realism about perception. First, a number of extant allegedly direct realist accounts are critically assessed, then the slogan that memory is past-perception is explained, defended against objections, and compared to extant rival views. Consequently, it is argued that direct realism about memory is a coherent and defensible view, and an attractive alternative to both the mainstream causal theories and the post-causal and constructivist views.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSyntheseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02751-8en_US
dc.subjectMemoryen_US
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryen_US
dc.subjectDirect realismen_US
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectConstructivismen_US
dc.titlePreteriception: memory as past-perceptionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-020-02751-8en_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorAranyosi, Istvan


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