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dc.contributor.authorEsen, Berk
dc.contributor.authorGümüşcü, Ş.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-08T13:29:49Z
dc.date.available2021-03-08T13:29:49Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn1354-0688
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75894
dc.description.abstractAfter decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleParty Politicsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068820923722en_US
dc.subjectAKPen_US
dc.subjectClientelismen_US
dc.subjectDemocratic breakdownen_US
dc.subjectRecep Tayyip Erdoğanen_US
dc.subjectTurkeyen_US
dc.titleWhy did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.epage17en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1354068820923722en_US
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsen_US
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorEsen, Berk


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