In this thesis, we investigate effects of taking possibility in the dictator game and choice of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on distribution decisions of active players where the dictator game setting in which the dictator can take from the initial endowment of the passive player is referred as the taking game. We use a betweensubjects design with three treatments, of which first two serve as control treatments: (i) exogenously assigned dictator game (EX-D), (ii) exogenously assigned taking game (EXT), and (iii) endogenous treatment where passive subjects choose to play either dictator game (EN-D) or taking game (EN-T). Our findings, in conformity with our hypotheses, suggest that (i) giving is less in EX-T (EN-T) than in EX-D (EN-D), (ii) passive players choose EN-D more frequently than they choose EN-T, (iii) the mere fact that EN-D is played due to the choice of passive player makes them accountable which leads to less giving by dictators in EN-D than in EX-D, finally (iv) giving in EN-T and EX-T are same. We also conduct an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants can predict most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explain factors that might have driven predicted behavior using a reasoning similar to ours. To our knowledge, this is the first work to study endogenous game selection and its impacts on giving behavior in a dictator game setting by allowing passive players to choose the game they want to play.