• About
  • Policies
  • What is openaccess
  • Library
  • Contact
Advanced search
      View Item 
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

      Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game

      Thumbnail
      View / Download
      249.3 Kb
      Author
      İlkılıç, Rahmi
      İkizler, Hüseyin
      Date
      2019-01
      Source Title
      Review of Economic Design
      Print ISSN
      1434-4742
      Electronic ISSN
      1434-4750
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      23
      Issue
      1-2
      Pages
      13 - 25
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
      77
      views
      47
      downloads
      Abstract
      This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions.
      Keywords
      Networks
      Network formation
      Pairwise-stability
      Equilibrium refinement
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/53445
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00218-y
      Collections
      • Department of Economics 649
      Show full item record

      Browse

      All of BUIRCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartmentsThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartments

      My Account

      Login

      Statistics

      View Usage StatisticsView Google Analytics Statistics

      Bilkent University

      If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the site administrator. Phone: (312) 290 1771
      Copyright © Bilkent University - Library IT

      Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access | Admin | Privacy