Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game

Date
2019-01
Editor(s)
Advisor
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
Source Title
Review of Economic Design
Print ISSN
1434-4742
Electronic ISSN
1434-4750
Publisher
Springer
Volume
23
Issue
1-2
Pages
13 - 25
Language
English
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Series
Abstract

This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions.

Course
Other identifiers
Book Title
Citation
Published Version (Please cite this version)