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dc.contributor.authorErzurumlu, S. S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJoglekar, N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLe´vesque, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTanrısever, Fehmien_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-18T13:01:56Z
dc.date.available2020-02-18T13:01:56Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1042-2587
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/53417
dc.description.abstractWe draw upon stewardship theory to formally derive bounds on the investment amount in a business prospect, and to characterize ownership sharing when investors offer two-stage financing along with know-how to increase the prospect’s valuation. In the early-development stage, we show that the direct effect of investor know-how increases the entrepreneur’s share while the indirect effect from that know-how due to its interaction with the investment size, decreases it. In the subsequent growth stage, the direct effect decreases the entrepreneur’s share while the indirect effect increases it. These tradeoffs offer theoretical and practical implications for writing investment contracts involving investor know-how.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleEntrepreneurship Theory and Practiceen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1042258717744205en_US
dc.subjectStage-based contracten_US
dc.subjectInvestor know-howen_US
dc.subjectValue creationen_US
dc.subjectAngel investorsen_US
dc.subjectStewardship theoryen_US
dc.subjectEmpirical analysisen_US
dc.subjectMathematical analysisen_US
dc.titleHow angel know-how shapes ownership sharing in stage-based contractsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Managementen_US
dc.citation.spage773en_US
dc.citation.epage801en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber43en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/1042258717744205en_US
dc.publisherSage Publicationsen_US
dc.contributor.bilkentauthorTanrısever, Fehmi
dc.identifier.eissn1540-6520


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