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      The evolution of cooperation in finite populations with synergistic payoffs

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      Author
      Ventura, Rafael
      Date
      2019
      Source Title
      Biology and Philosophy
      Print ISSN
      0169-3867
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      34
      Issue
      4
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      Abstract
      In a series of papers, Forber and Smead (J Philos 111(3):151–166, 2014, Biol Philos 30(3):405–421, 2015) and Smead and Forber (Evolution 67(3):698–707, 2013) make a valuable contribution to the study of cooperation in finite populations by analyzing an understudied model: the prisoner’s delight. It always pays to cooperate in the one-shot prisoner’s delight, so this model presents a best-case scenario for the evolution of cooperation. Yet, what Forber and Smead find is highly counterintuitive. In finite populations playing the prisoner’s delight, increasing the benefit of cooperation causes selection to favor defection. Here, I extend their model by considering the effects of non-linear payoffs. In particular, I show that interesting subtleties arise when payoffs are synergistic. Indeed, analysis reveals that increasing the benefit of cooperation does not always favor the spread of defection if payoffs are synergistic. I conclude by drawing some general considerations about robustness analysis in evolutionary models.
      Keywords
      Cooperation
      Prisoner’s delight
      Finite populations
      Synergy
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      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/52952
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9695-x
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