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      • Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering
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      Binary signaling under subjective priors and costs as a game

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      Author
      Sarıtaş, S.
      Gezici, Sinan
      Yüksel, S.
      Editor
      Teel, A. R.
      Egerstedt, M.
      Date
      2019
      Source Title
      Proceedings of the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
      Print ISSN
      0743-1546
      Electronic ISSN
      2576-2370
      Publisher
      Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
      Pages
      1130 - 1135
      Language
      English
      Type
      Conference Paper
      Item Usage Stats
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      49
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      Abstract
      Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. In addition, the effects of subjective priors and costs on Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and non-informative equilibria cases, under certain conditions, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.
      Keywords
      Transmitters
      Receivers
      Games
      Nash equilibrium
      Decoding
      Perturbation methods
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/52843
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619612
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      • Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering 3524
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