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dc.contributor.authorGüner, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-19T10:57:58Z
dc.date.available2019-02-19T10:57:58Z
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.issn0738-8942
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49594
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a simple two-person game of one-sided incomplete information in extensive form to understand strategic choices made in the Turkish-Syrian linkage between water and terrorism. Turkish intelligence established Syrian support of a terrorist group that aims at an independent Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia. Yet, Turkey frequently stipulates the cessation of this support for negotiating with Syria a water agreement over the Euphrates. The game presents Turkey as a player having superior information. Syria is assumed to be uncertain about Turkish preferences with respect to the mutual conflict. This analysis identifies three pooling equilibria indicating that Syrian beliefs do not matter.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleConflict Management and Peace Scienceen_US
dc.titleSignalling in the Turkish-Syrian water conflicten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage185en_US
dc.citation.epage206en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber16en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.publisherSageen_US


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