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dc.contributor.authorWilliams, P. A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-12T07:21:20Z
dc.date.available2019-02-12T07:21:20Z
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.issn1475-3553
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49292
dc.description.abstractThis article compares the political economies of water and oil conflicts. It suggests that the ‘common pool resource’ (CPR) framework only partially explains the prototypically ‘upstream-downstream’ disputes over flowing water and oil ‘flows’, as CPR rivalry stems from users’ inability to exclude each other, while water and oil conflicts stem from certain users’ ability to exclude others. Yet, it also argues that key differences, related to the exclusivity of upstream sovereignty over resources, the ecological or economic nature of ‘downstream’ flow benefits, the practicality of ‘upstream’ flow control, and the size of the political benefits of gaining and exerting ‘upstream’control relative to its high economic costs, make ‘water war’ much less politically economic than oil conflict.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleThe Review of International Affairsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1080/1475355032000227149en_US
dc.subjectEconomicsen_US
dc.subjectConflicten_US
dc.subjectSovereigntyen_US
dc.subjectPetroleum industryen_US
dc.subjectPetroleumen_US
dc.titleThe common and uncommon political economies of water and oil ‘wars’en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage13en_US
dc.citation.epage28en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber3en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/1475355032000227149en_US
dc.publisherFrank Cass Publishersen_US


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