An evolutionary game analysis of balancing and bandwagoning in unipolar systems
Date
2017
Authors
Güner, S.
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Abstract
This article proposes a simple evolutionary game to analyze the stability of states’ balancing and bandwagoning behavior towards the sole superpower called the unipole. The trajectories leading to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) demonstrate possible alignment paths given environmental constraints of unipolar systems and game rules. States are found to bandwagon with or balance against the unipole. They can also become divided adopting opposite alignment behaviors. The evolutionarily stable strategies imply alternative views of socialization and competition processes for structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
Source Title
Journal of Game Theory
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Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.
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Language
English