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dc.contributor.authorGüner, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-23T16:43:37Z
dc.date.available2019-01-23T16:43:37Z
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.issn2325-0046
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/48294
dc.description.abstractThis article proposes a simple evolutionary game to analyze the stability of states’ balancing and bandwagoning behavior towards the sole superpower called the unipole. The trajectories leading to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) demonstrate possible alignment paths given environmental constraints of unipolar systems and game rules. States are found to bandwagon with or balance against the unipole. They can also become divided adopting opposite alignment behaviors. The evolutionarily stable strategies imply alternative views of socialization and competition processes for structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Game Theoryen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.5923/j.jgt.20170602.01en_US
dc.subjectUnipoleen_US
dc.subjectBalanceren_US
dc.subjectBandwagoneren_US
dc.subjectEvolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)en_US
dc.subjectUnipolar systemen_US
dc.subjectUnipolar environmenten_US
dc.titleAn evolutionary game analysis of balancing and bandwagoning in unipolar systemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.citation.spage21en_US
dc.citation.epage37en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber6en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.5923/j.jgt.20170602.01en_US
dc.publisherScientific & Academic Publishing Co.en_US
dc.identifier.eissn2325-0054


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