An evolutionary game analysis of balancing and bandwagoning in unipolar systems

Date

2017

Authors

Güner, S.

Editor(s)

Advisor

Supervisor

Co-Advisor

Co-Supervisor

Instructor

BUIR Usage Stats
2
views
40
downloads

Citation Stats

Series

Abstract

This article proposes a simple evolutionary game to analyze the stability of states’ balancing and bandwagoning behavior towards the sole superpower called the unipole. The trajectories leading to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) demonstrate possible alignment paths given environmental constraints of unipolar systems and game rules. States are found to bandwagon with or balance against the unipole. They can also become divided adopting opposite alignment behaviors. The evolutionarily stable strategies imply alternative views of socialization and competition processes for structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Source Title

Journal of Game Theory

Publisher

Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.

Course

Other identifiers

Book Title

Degree Discipline

Degree Level

Degree Name

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English