An evolutionary game analysis of balancing and bandwagoning in unipolar systems
Author(s)
Date
2017Source Title
Journal of Game Theory
Print ISSN
2325-0046
Electronic ISSN
2325-0054
Publisher
Scientific & Academic Publishing Co.
Volume
6
Issue
2
Pages
21 - 37
Language
English
Type
ArticleItem Usage Stats
94
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38
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Abstract
This article proposes a simple evolutionary game to analyze the stability of states’ balancing and bandwagoning
behavior towards the sole superpower called the unipole. The trajectories leading to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs)
demonstrate possible alignment paths given environmental constraints of unipolar systems and game rules. States are found
to bandwagon with or balance against the unipole. They can also become divided adopting opposite alignment behaviors. The
evolutionarily stable strategies imply alternative views of socialization and competition processes for structural realism,
liberalism, and constructivism.
Keywords
UnipoleBalancer
Bandwagoner
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
Unipolar system
Unipolar environment