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dc.contributor.advisorDalkıran, Nuh Aygün
dc.contributor.authorÖztürk, Fatih
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-01T08:12:14Z
dc.date.available2018-08-01T08:12:14Z
dc.date.copyright2018-07
dc.date.issued2018-07
dc.date.submitted2018-07-31
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/47703
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2018.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leave 43).en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study a principal-agent problem where we model the uncertainty regarding the relationship between the level of effort and the monetary outcome using the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005). We provide comparative statics on the optimal wage scheme when the agent has constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) preferences. Our main result implies that whether the optimal wage scheme should be higher-powered or lower-powered depends on an intuitive measure of ambiguity.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Fatih Öztürk.en_US
dc.format.extentviii, 46 leaves : graphics ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectAmbiguity Aversionen_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.subjectMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subjectOptimal Contracten_US
dc.titleThe optimal structure of incentives in the principal–agent problem under the smooth ambiguity modelen_US
dc.title.alternativePürüzsüz muğlaklık modeli altında asıl-vekil problemindeki tesviklerin optimal yapısıen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB158746
dc.embargo.release2021-07-31


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