• About
  • Policies
  • What is openaccess
  • Library
  • Contact
Advanced search
      View Item 
      •   BUIR Home
      • University Library
      • Bilkent Theses
      • Theses - Department of Economics
      • Dept. of Economics - Master's degree
      • View Item
      •   BUIR Home
      • University Library
      • Bilkent Theses
      • Theses - Department of Economics
      • Dept. of Economics - Master's degree
      • View Item
      JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

      The optimal structure of incentives in the principal–agent problem under the smooth ambiguity model

      Thumbnail
      Embargo Lift Date: 2021-07-31
      View / Download
      792.2 Kb
      Author
      Öztürk, Fatih
      Advisor
      Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
      Date
      2018-07
      Publisher
      Bilkent University
      Language
      English
      Type
      Thesis
      Item Usage Stats
      167
      views
      0
      downloads
      Abstract
      We study a principal-agent problem where we model the uncertainty regarding the relationship between the level of effort and the monetary outcome using the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005). We provide comparative statics on the optimal wage scheme when the agent has constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) preferences. Our main result implies that whether the optimal wage scheme should be higher-powered or lower-powered depends on an intuitive measure of ambiguity.
      Keywords
      Ambiguity Aversion
      Incentives
      Moral Hazard
      Optimal Contract
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/47703
      Collections
      • Dept. of Economics - Master's degree 291
      Show full item record

      Browse

      All of BUIRCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartmentsThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartments

      My Account

      Login

      Statistics

      View Usage StatisticsView Google Analytics Statistics

      Bilkent University

      If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the site administrator. Phone: (312) 290 1771
      © Bilkent University - Library IT

      Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access | Admin | Privacy