On the reflection principle
Author
Kavas, Gizem
Advisor
Wigley, Simon D.
Date
2018-06Publisher
Bilkent University
Language
English
Type
ThesisItem Usage Stats
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Abstract
In ‘Belief and the Will’ van Fraassen (1984: 255) argues that traditional epistemology
allows one to believe in propositions that are not entailed by the evidence
at hand, while at the same time acknowledging that what is taken to be evidence
may in fact turn out to be false. However van Fraassen (1984) shows the incoherence
in such agent’s belief states by a diachronic Dutch Book argument, in which
such agents are shown to be vulnerable to sure losses in sets of wagers which he
regards as fair, which deems him as irrational. As a solution to this problem, van
Fraassen (1984) formulates the Reflection Principle as a further constraint for
rational agents’ credences. In this thesis I will critically evaluate the Reflection
Principle as a constraint for rational agent’s credences, and conclude that the
Reflection Principle as an attack and solution to the traditional epistemological
view is unsuccessful since it is incompatible with epistemic agency.
Keywords
CredenceDutch Book Arguments
Rationality Constraints
Reflection Principle
Sleeping Beauty Problem