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dc.contributor.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorDede, Yasemin
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-13T12:11:10Z
dc.date.available2018-06-13T12:11:10Z
dc.date.copyright2018-05
dc.date.issued2018-06
dc.date.submitted2018-06-12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/47588
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2018en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 98-100).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe primary purpose of this study is to analyze both cooperative and nonco- operative games under semitransferable utility. In game theory literature, utility seems so far to have been assumed not to be transferable at all in noncoopera- tive games, while both fully transferable and nontransferable utility are con- sidered in the context of cooperative games. There are, however, an abundance of real life situations, where utility is partially transferable. Here we introduce the notion of semitransferable utility, which encompasses full-transferability and nontransferability as its two extreme special subcases. We explore and exem- plify what changes some well-known equilibrium notions undergo when one allows utility to be only partially transferable. In particular, we relate core allocations in a convex cooperative transferable utility (TU) game to their counterparts in a corresponding strategic context, to show that, for each core allocation of a given TU game, there is a strategic form game, where that allocation survives, while almost all other allocations are eliminated.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Yasemin Dede.en_US
dc.format.extentvii, 100 leaves ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectαCoreen_US
dc.subjectβCoreen_US
dc.subjectCooperative Gamesen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.subjectNoncooperative Gamesen_US
dc.titleAnalysis of cooperative behavior when utility is semi-transferableen_US
dc.title.alternativeFaydanın yarı aktarılabilir olduğu durumlarda işbirlikli davranışın incelenmesien_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB158470
dc.embargo.release2021-06-12


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