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dc.contributor.authorSaritas S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYuksel, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGezici, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T11:43:10Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T11:43:10Z
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781509059928
dc.identifier.issn0743-1619
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/37536
dc.description.abstractSimultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and multi-dimensional cheap talk, the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is always fully revealing. Further, the final state Nash equilibria have to be essentially quantized when the source is scalar and has a density, and non-revealing for the multi-dimensional case. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gauss-Markov source over a memoryless Gaussian channel is considered, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for both scalar and multi-dimensional sources under Nash equilibria; however, the Stackelberg equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources but may be non-linear for multi-dimensional sources. Further, under the Stackelberg setup, the conditions under which the equilibrium is non-informative are derived for scalar sources. © 2017 American Automatic Control Council (AACC).en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleProceedings of the American Control Conferenceen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.23919/ACC.2017.7963511en_US
dc.subjectBayesian networksen_US
dc.subjectBayesian formulationen_US
dc.subjectGaussian channelsen_US
dc.subjectInvariant subspaceen_US
dc.subjectMulti dimensionalen_US
dc.subjectMulti-dimensional caseen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen_US
dc.subjectSignaling gameen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.titleNash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling gamesen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineering
dc.citation.spage3644en_US
dc.citation.epage3649en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.23919/ACC.2017.7963511en_US
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.en_US


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