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      Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for dynamic cheap talk and signaling games

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      Author
      Sarıtaş, Serkan
      Yüksel, S.
      Gezici, Sinan
      Date
      2017
      Source Title
      Proceedings of the American Control Conference, IEEE 2017
      Print ISSN
      0743-1619
      Publisher
      IEEE
      Pages
      3644 - 3649
      Language
      English
      Type
      Conference Paper
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      Abstract
      Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar and multi-dimensional cheap talk, the Nash equilibrium cannot be fully revealing whereas the Stackelberg equilibrium is always fully revealing. Further, the final state Nash equilibria have to be essentially quantized when the source is scalar and has a density, and non-revealing for the multi-dimensional case. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gauss-Markov source over a memoryless Gaussian channel is considered, affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for both scalar and multi-dimensional sources under Nash equilibria; however, the Stackelberg equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources but may be non-linear for multi-dimensional sources. Further, under the Stackelberg setup, the conditions under which the equilibrium is non-informative are derived for scalar sources.
      Keywords
      Bayesian networks
      Bayesian formulation
      Gaussian channels
      Invariant subspace
      Multi dimensional
      Multi-dimensional case
      Nash equilibria
      Signaling game
      Stackelberg equilibrium
      Game theory
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/37536
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/ACC.2017.7963511
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      • Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering 3339

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