In the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkish foreign policy has once again become the subject of debate amongst political, academic and diplomatic circles, as well as media outlets. The discussions put forward questions on Turkey’s NATO membership, its relations with the EU, its trustworthiness in allying in the fight against ISIL in the region, and the likeliness of Turkey’s slide into new axis of alliance with Russia and Iran. Despite the speculative potential of these foreign policy questions, Turkish foreign policy inclinations and the country’s interactions with international institutions and individual nation states need to be revised after the July 15 coup attempt. This paper argues that that the recent domestic developments in Turkey, which actually started with a confrontation between the Gulenists and AK Party government over the control of state institutions and then resulted in the coup attempt, have certain implications for the country’s near foreign policy inclinations. New Turkish foreign policy, which can be traced back to the end of 2013, takes on the mantel of a more rational, operational and internationally-focused policymaker. Although rational and operational mode of action may signal neorealism in the new Turkish foreign policy, Turkey will continue its value-based reservations, especially in the making of international order.