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dc.contributor.authorWoods, J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:56:56Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:56:56Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36900
dc.description.abstractI discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be the most natural minimal way of distinguishing content and form and suggest further problems arising for this route. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSyntheseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0797-yen_US
dc.subjectAssertion/denialen_US
dc.subjectCut/transitivityen_US
dc.subjectLogical consequenceen_US
dc.subjectLogical formen_US
dc.subjectRestallen_US
dc.titleAssertion, denial, content, and (logical) formen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage1667en_US
dc.citation.epage1680en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber193en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-015-0797-yen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US


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