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      Order of limits in reputations

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      Author(s)
      Dalkıran, N. A.
      Date
      2016
      Source Title
      Theory and Decision
      Print ISSN
      0040-5833
      Electronic ISSN
      1573-7187
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      81
      Issue
      3
      Pages
      393 - 411
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      Abstract
      The fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known that these large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs rely on long-run players being arbitrarily patient. We study reputation games where a long-run player plays a fixed stage-game against an infinite sequence of short-run players under imperfect public monitoring. We show that in such games, introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. This holds true no matter how patient the long-run player is, as long as her discount factor is fixed. This result highlights the fact that the aforementioned large effects arise due to an order of limits argument, as anticipated. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
      Keywords
      Order of limits
      Repeated games with short-run and long-run players
      Reputations
      Decision support systems
      Decision theory
      Adverse selection
      Complete information
      Continuity
      Discount factors
      Incomplete information
      Order of limits
      Repeated games
      Reputations
      Risk management
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/36899
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9539-y
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