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dc.contributor.advisorSarıgil, Zekien_US
dc.contributor.authorFazlıoğlu, Ömeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-29T12:02:44Z
dc.date.available2017-09-29T12:02:44Z
dc.date.copyright2017-09
dc.date.issued2017-09
dc.date.submitted2017-09-29
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/33770
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.): Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Administration, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 217-241).en_US
dc.description.abstractUtilizing mixed-method design and multiple data sources (primarily three nationwide public opinion surveys and 113 semi-structured elite interviews), this study examines the power-sharing perspectives in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict. It raises two main sets of questions at both elite and mass levels: Who and to what extent does support power sharing arrangements in a multi-ethnic country? Which factors can explain the variance in ethnic group members’ and ethno-political elites’ varying support for power-sharing arrangements? This study shows that Turks and Kurds’ understandings of and interest-formulations with regard to the power-sharing remain irreconcilable both at the mass and elite levels. At the mass-level, the Turks' opposition to the Kurds' ever-growing power-sharing demands remain strong and constant across years. Regarding Kurdish mass support for power sharing, the findings of the multivariate analyses support the main propositions of the grievance theory, whereas they disprove the merits of ‘Muslim brotherhood’ – i.e., sharing an overarching religious identity - and socio-economic approaches. At the elite level, the Kurdish elites remain divided in terms of their outlook to the power-sharing arrangements due to their competing interest-formulations. Challenging the unitary actor assumption of the power-sharing theory, this study advocates that the devolution of power creates winners and losers within the peripheral ethnic groups and, thereby fosters intra-ethnic infighting. This thesis proposes a bi-dimensional re-formulation of power-sharing as a conflict-management tool: vertical dimension, overhauling the power structure between the central government and peripheral groups; and horizontal dimension, regulating the power structure between competing co-ethnic segments within the peripheral group. This thesis concludes that under current conditions power-sharing governance remains infeasible in the resolution of the Turkey's Kurdish conflict.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Ömer Fazlıoğlu.en_US
dc.format.extentix, 241 leaves : charts ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectEthnic Conflicten_US
dc.subjectEthnic Infightingen_US
dc.subjectKurdish Problemen_US
dc.subjectPower-Sharingen_US
dc.subjectReligionen_US
dc.titleSearching for power-sharing arrangements in the resolution of ethnic conflicts : the case of Kurdish conflict in Turkeyen_US
dc.title.alternativeEtnik çatışmaların çözümünde güç-paylaşımı düzenlemeleri: Kürt sorunu vakasıen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Political Science and Public Administrationen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB156519
dc.embargo.release2020-09-28


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