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dc.contributor.advisorKoray, Semihen_US
dc.contributor.authorSezer, İlhanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T11:04:39Z
dc.date.available2016-07-01T11:04:39Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/29763
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis studies manipulations of equilibria by candidates in two-alternative elections along with their effects on voter turnout, winner of the election and social welfare where voters have common values, and both voting and manipulating are costly. We show that manipulation is not desirable for the society, and the candidates’ incentives for manipulating can be mitigated by appropriately sequencing the order of manipulations. We present some results of a manipulation game which may rather unexpected under the assumption that the candidates have prior beliefs about each others’ manipulations. Finally we determine the set of manipulations which can be prevented by informed voters for a given composition of society.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilitySezer, İlhanen_US
dc.format.extentvi, 76 leavesen_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectVotingen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectSocial Welfareen_US
dc.subjectVoter Turnouten_US
dc.subjectTrust Ratioen_US
dc.subject.lccJF1001 .S49 2006en_US
dc.subject.lcshElections.en_US
dc.titleManipulation via information in large electionsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidBILKUTUPB096136


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