Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorDalkiran, N.A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHoffman, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPaturi, R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRicketts, D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorVattani, A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T12:12:17Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T12:12:17Z
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/28142
dc.description.abstractMany puzzling social behaviors, such as avoiding eye contact, using innuendos, and insignificant events that trigger revolutions, seem to relate to common knowledge and coordination, but the exact relationship has yet to be formalized. Herein, we present such a formalization. We state necessary and sufficient conditions for what we call state-dependent equilibria - equilibria where players play different strategies in different states of the world. In particular, if everybody behaves a certain way (e.g. does not revolt) in the usual state of the world, then in order for players to be able to behave a different way (e.g. revolt) in another state of the world, it is both necessary and sufficient for it to be common p-believed that it is not the usual state of the world, where common p-belief is a relaxation of common knowledge introduced by Monderer and Samet [16]. Our framework applies to many player r-coordination games - a generalization of coordination games that we introduce - and common (r,p)-beliefs - a generalization of common p-beliefs that we introduce. We then apply these theorems to two particular signaling structures to obtain novel results. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_8en_US
dc.subjectCommon knowledgeen_US
dc.subjectEye contacten_US
dc.subjectSocial behavioren_US
dc.subjectState-dependenten_US
dc.subjectSufficient conditionsen_US
dc.subjectAlgorithmsen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.titleCommon knowledge and state-dependent equilibriaen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.citation.spage84en_US
dc.citation.epage95en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber7615 LNCSen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_8en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record