• About
  • Policies
  • What is openaccess
  • Library
  • Contact
Advanced search
      View Item 
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

      Common knowledge and state-dependent equilibria

      Thumbnail
      View / Download
      220.2 Kb
      Author
      Dalkıran, Nuh Aygun
      Hoffman, M.
      Paturi, R.
      Ricketts, D.
      Vattani, A.
      Date
      2012
      Source Title
      Algorithmic Game Theory
      Print ISSN
      0302-9743
      Publisher
      Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
      Volume
      7615
      Pages
      84 - 95
      Language
      English
      Type
      Conference Paper
      Item Usage Stats
      154
      views
      141
      downloads
      Abstract
      Many puzzling social behaviors, such as avoiding eye contact, using innuendos, and insignificant events that trigger revolutions, seem to relate to common knowledge and coordination, but the exact relationship has yet to be formalized. Herein, we present such a formalization. We state necessary and sufficient conditions for what we call state-dependent equilibria - equilibria where players play different strategies in different states of the world. In particular, if everybody behaves a certain way (e.g. does not revolt) in the usual state of the world, then in order for players to be able to behave a different way (e.g. revolt) in another state of the world, it is both necessary and sufficient for it to be common p-believed that it is not the usual state of the world, where common p-belief is a relaxation of common knowledge introduced by Monderer and Samet [16]. Our framework applies to many player r-coordination games - a generalization of coordination games that we introduce - and common (r,p)-beliefs - a generalization of common p-beliefs that we introduce. We then apply these theorems to two particular signaling structures to obtain novel results. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
      Keywords
      Common knowledge
      Eye contact
      Social behavior
      State-dependent
      Sufficient conditions
      Algorithms
      Game theory
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/28142
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_8
      Collections
      • Department of Economics 649
      Show full item record

      Browse

      All of BUIRCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartmentsThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartments

      My Account

      Login

      Statistics

      View Usage StatisticsView Google Analytics Statistics

      Bilkent University

      If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the site administrator. Phone: (312) 290 1771
      Copyright © Bilkent University - Library IT

      Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access | Admin | Privacy