Swarming behavior as Nash equilibrium
Author
Özgüler, A. Bülent
Yıldız, Aykut
Date
2012-09Source Title
Proceedings of the 3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems
Print ISSN
1474-6670
Publisher
Elsevier
Volume
45
Issue
26
Pages
151 - 155
Language
English
Type
Conference PaperItem Usage Stats
151
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125
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Abstract
The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.