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dc.contributor.authorÖzgüler, A. B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYildiz, A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T11:01:14Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T11:01:14Z
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn2168-2267
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/26536
dc.description.abstractThe question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleIEEE Transactions on Cyberneticsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCYB.2013.2283102en_US
dc.subjectArtificial potentialsen_US
dc.subjectdifferential gameen_US
dc.subjectHamilton-Jacobien_US
dc.subjectmultiagent systemsen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectAnt colony optimizationen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectMulti agent systemsen_US
dc.subjectArtificial potentialsen_US
dc.subjectDifferential gamesen_US
dc.subjectHamilton-Jacobien_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen_US
dc.subjectTelecommunication networksen_US
dc.subjectComputer Simulationen_US
dc.subjectCyberneticsen_US
dc.subjectGame Theoryen_US
dc.subjectModels, Biologicalen_US
dc.titleForaging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.citation.spage979en_US
dc.citation.epage987en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber44en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TCYB.2013.2283102en_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US


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