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dc.contributor.authorFessenbecker, P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T11:00:45Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T11:00:45Zen_US
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn0042-522
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/26504
dc.description.abstractThis essay takes as its point of departure Anthony Trollope’s tendency to reuse a version of the romantic triangle, one where a protagonist is committed to one character, becomes attracted to another, and hence delays fulfillment of the first relationship. This formal feature makes the philosophical problem of akrasia central, as the novels return repeatedly to agents who act against their own best judgment. Trollope’s novels reveal a complex array of irrationality, considering how our desires can lead to self-deception and how even judgment unbiased by desire may fail to move an agent. Perhaps most interestingly, Trollope challenges standard assumptions about rational behavior in depicting states of “ethical confusion,” where characters act irrationally precisely by acting on their best judgment. © 2014, Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleVictorian Studiesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2979/victorianstudies.56.4.649en_US
dc.subjectAkrasiaen_US
dc.subjectMoral judgmenten_US
dc.subjectMoral agencyen_US
dc.subjectDesireen_US
dc.subjectMoral psychologyen_US
dc.subjectNarratorsen_US
dc.subjectSelf deceptionen_US
dc.subjectMoralityen_US
dc.subjectRationalityen_US
dc.titleAnthony trollope on akrasia, self-deception, and ethical confusionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentProgram in Cultures, Civilization and Ideasen_US
dc.citation.spage649en_US
dc.citation.epage674en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber56en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.2979/victorianstudies.56.4.649en_US
dc.publisherIndiana Universityen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1527-2052


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