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dc.contributor.authorDemir, H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:59:23Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:59:23Z
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.issn0024-5836
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/26407
dc.description.abstractAccording to the Veridicality Thesis, information encapsulates truth. An important implication of this thesis is that misinformation and disinformation are not types of information at all. The first clear formulation of the thesis is provided by Dretske (1981). Floridi (2011), a more recent defender of the Veridicality Thesis, offers two novel arguments in defense of this thesis. His first argument, the argument from splitting, is based on two different usages of adjectives: attributive and predicative. Floridi claims that 'false' in 'false information' is used attributively, which implies that 'false information' is not a kind of information. In his second argument, the argument from semantic loss of information, he argues that without the Veridicality Thesis it becomes difficult to make sense of the ordinary phenomenon of semantic erosion. The literature is lacking in a comprehensive and detailed treatment of Floridi's arguments. In particular, an analysis of his quite lengthy and technical second argument is lacking. This is what I intend to do in this paper. The conclusion of my analysis is, unfortunately, a negative one: neither of the two arguments offered by Floridi is strong enough to establish the desired conclusion. My analysis shows that the argument from splitting commits a basic fallacy, petitio principii. As for his second argument, I argue that it is possible to account for semantic erosion even without adopting the truthfulness requirement for information. In short, my analysis shows that the logical structures of Floridi's arguments are not sufficiently strong enough for establishing me Thesis. © 2014 by Peeters Publishers. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleLogique et Analyseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2143/LEA.226.0.3032651en_US
dc.subjectArgument from semantic loss of informationen_US
dc.subjectArgument from splittingen_US
dc.subjectBar-Hillel and carnap paradoxen_US
dc.subjectDretskeen_US
dc.subjectFloridien_US
dc.subjectSemantic erosionen_US
dc.subjectVeridicality thesisen_US
dc.titleTaking stock: arguments for the veridicality thesisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage117en_US
dc.citation.epage135en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber57en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber226en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.2143/LEA.226.0.3032651en_US
dc.publisherNationaal Centrum voor Navorsingen in de Logica (Centre National de Recherches de Logique)en_US


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