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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:50:41Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:50:41Z
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.issn0095-0696
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25809
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies free-riding incentives on common environmental resources in an incomplete information repeated game where abatements are perishable and perfect substitutes. Two contrasting types of perfect Bayesian equilibria emerge: For high discount factors, or low discount factors but 'pessimistic' prior beliefs, the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of abatements. Otherwise the countries attempt to use their private information strategically and the game becomes a war of attrition. This generates an outcome where the 'pessimistic' country unilaterally abates forever, and another which involves delay until the first abatement if both countries are 'optimistic'.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Environmental Economics and Managementen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0020en_US
dc.titleIncomplete information and incentives to free ride on international environmental resourcesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage301en_US
dc.citation.epage315en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber30en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeem.1996.0020en_US
dc.publisherAcademic Pressen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1096-0449


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