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dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:49:44Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:49:44Z
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.issn1761714
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25735
dc.description.abstractWe study private provision of a continuous public good in an incomplete information repeated game. The analysis generates the following predictions in the form of Perfect Bayesian equilibria. When the discount factor is low, the game played by increasingly optimistic players may collapse into a war of attrition: delay may occur and one player may bear the burden of providing the public good while the other free rides forever. On the other hand, if the discount factor is high, or low but prior beliefs are "pessimistic", the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of contributions. © Springer-Verlag 1996.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.titleIncomplete information and incentives to free rideen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.citation.spage419en_US
dc.citation.epage432en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber13en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US


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