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      A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

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      Author(s)
      Bac, M.
      Date
      2000
      Source Title
      International Journal of Game Theory
      Print ISSN
      0020-7276
      Electronic ISSN
      1432-1270
      Publisher
      Springer
      Volume
      29
      Issue
      1
      Pages
      119 - 126
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
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      Abstract
      Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.
      Keywords
      Alternating offers bargaining
      Delay
      Incomplete information
      Sequential equilibrium
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/25082
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      https://doi.org/10.1007/s001829900024
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      • Department of Economics 697
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