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dc.contributor.authorKerschbamer, R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKoray, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:34:06Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:34:06Z
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24768
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrangements which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple non-cooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium is introduced to predict the outcome of the contract-design game among principals. Symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria may not exist in perfectly symmetric environments. In a symmetric Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in mixed strategies coordination failure may lead to a suboptimal institutional network in which the agents "cheat" their principals. © Springer-Verlag 2001.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013693en_US
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen_US
dc.subjectEpsilon contracting equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectMultiagentsen_US
dc.subjectMultiprincipalsen_US
dc.titleMultiprincipals multiagents incentive designen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.citation.spage5en_US
dc.citation.epage40en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber6en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/PL00013693en_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.identifier.eissn1434-4750


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