• About
  • Policies
  • What is open access
  • Library
  • Contact
Advanced search
      View Item 
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      •   BUIR Home
      • Scholarly Publications
      • Faculty of Economics, Administrative And Social Sciences
      • Department of Economics
      • View Item
      JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

      Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies-an international perspective

      Thumbnail
      View / Download
      185.7 Kb
      Author(s)
      Cukierman, A.
      Miller, G. P.
      Neyapti, B.
      Date
      2002
      Source Title
      Journal of Monetary Economics
      Print ISSN
      0304-3932
      Electronic ISSN
      1873-1295
      Publisher
      Elsevier BV
      Volume
      49
      Issue
      2
      Pages
      237 - 264
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
      Item Usage Stats
      201
      views
      503
      downloads
      Abstract
      This paper develops extensive new indices of legal independence (central bank indepedence (CBI) for new central banks (CBs) in 26 former socialist economies. The indices reveal that CB reform in the FSE during the 1990s has been quite ambitious. In spite of large price shocks, reformers in those countries chose to create CBs with levels of legal independence that are substantially higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the 1980s. The evidence in the paper shows that CBI is unrelated to inflation during the early stages of liberalization. But for sufficiently high and sustained levels of liberalization, and controlling for other variables, legal CBI and inflation are significantly and negatively related. These findings are consistent with the view that even high CBI cannot contain the initial powerful inflationary impact of price decontrols. But once the process of liberalization has gathered sufficient momentum legal independence becomes effective in reducing inflation. The paper also presents evidence on factors that affect the choice of CBI and examines the relation between inflation and CBI in a broader sample. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
      Keywords
      Central banks
      Inflation
      Legal independence
      Reform
      Transition economies
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24718
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00107-6
      Collections
      • Department of Economics 724
      Show full item record

      Browse

      All of BUIRCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartmentsCoursesThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsAdvisorsBy Issue DateKeywordsTypeDepartmentsCourses

      My Account

      Login

      Statistics

      View Usage StatisticsView Google Analytics Statistics

      Bilkent University

      If you have trouble accessing this page and need to request an alternate format, contact the site administrator. Phone: (312) 290 2976
      © Bilkent University - Library IT

      Contact Us | Send Feedback | Off-Campus Access | Admin | Privacy