Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorVahid, H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:25:02Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:25:02Z
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24163
dc.description.abstractAccording to the thesis of epistemic conservatism it would be unreasonable to change one’s beliefs in the absence of any good reasons. Although it is claimed that epistemic conservatism has informed and resolved a number of positions and problems in epistemology, it is difficult to identify a single representative view of the thesis. This has resulted in advancing a series of disparate and largely unconnected arguments to establish conservatism. In this paper, I begin by casting doubt on the claim of widespread and genuine applications of the conservative policy. I then distinguish between three main varieties of epistemic conservatism, namely, differential, perseverance and generation conservatism Having evaluated various arguments that have been offered or may be considered on behalf of the conservative thesis, I close by concluding that those versions of the thesis that survive critical scrutiny fail to live up to the aspirations of the thesis as a substantive canon of rationality, that to the extent that principles of conservatism are epistemically promising, they are not plausible. While to the extent that they are plausible, they are not of much epistemic interest.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleSyntheseen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035849.62840.e8en_US
dc.titleVarieties of epistemic conservatismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage97en_US
dc.citation.epage122en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber141en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035849.62840.e8en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record