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      Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems

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      Author(s)
      Doğan, B.
      Yıldız, K.
      Date
      2016
      Source Title
      Games and Economic Behavior
      Print ISSN
      0899-8256
      Electronic ISSN
      1090-2473
      Publisher
      Academic Press
      Volume
      95
      Pages
      47 - 58
      Language
      English
      Type
      Article
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      Abstract
      We study marriage problems where two groups of agents, men and women, match each other and probabilistic assignments are possible. When only ordinal preferences are observable, stochastic dominance efficiency (sd-efficiency) is commonly used. First, we provide a characterization of sd-efficient allocations in terms of a property of an order relation defined on the set of man-woman pairs. Then, using this characterization, we constructively prove that for each probabilistic assignment that is sd-efficient for some ordinal preferences, there is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences for which the assignment is Pareto efficient. Second, we show that when the preferences are strict, for each ordinal preference profile and each ex-post stable probabilistic assignment, there is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile, consistent with the ordinal preferences, for which the assignment belongs to the core of the associated transferable utility game. © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
      Keywords
      Efficiency
      Marriage problems
      Probabilistic assignment
      Stability
      Permalink
      http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23591
      Published Version (Please cite this version)
      http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.001
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      • Department of Economics 724
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