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dc.contributor.authorWigley, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:14:59Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:14:59Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.issn0951-5089
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/23506
dc.description.abstractCognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while conscious acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it, automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task unthinkingly does not. However, our apparent lack of conscious control while we are undergoing automaticity challenges the idea that there is a relevant moral difference between these two forms of unconscious behavior. In both cases the agent lacks access to information that might help them guide their actions so as to avoid harms. In response, it is argued that the crucial distinction between the automatic agent and the agent undergoing an automatism, such as somnambulism or petit mal epilepsy, lies in the fact that the former can preprogram the activation and interruption of automatic behavior. Given that, it is argued that there is elbowroom for attributing responsibility to automated agents based on the quality of their will.en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titlePhilosophical Psychologyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080701197122en_US
dc.subjectAutomaticityen_US
dc.subjectAutomatismen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectIllusion of free willen_US
dc.subjectResponsibilityen_US
dc.titleAutomaticity, consciousness and moral responsibilityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.citation.spage209en_US
dc.citation.epage225en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber20en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09515080701197122en_US


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